Technology, Policy, Growth - Theory, Evidence and Interpretation by Jan Fagerberg
  1 
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, GROWTH - 
THEORY, EVIDENCE AND INTERPRETATION 
 
 
BY JAN FAGERBERG,   




In recent years the research on the relation between technology and economic growth 
has flourished. This paper presents a brief overview of different theoretical 
perspectives in this area; the old orthodox theory (that of Robert Solow and others), 
more heterodox approaches, and the new orthodox theory (commonly labelled new 
growth theory). Furthermore, we assess the relationship between these theoretical 
approaches and applied work on growth and policy. 
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TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, GROWTH - 
THEORY, EVIDENCE AND INTERPRETATION
1 
 
For many years economic growth was considered a quite boring theme. Some 
universities even stopped to offer courses in economic growth. However, now the 
interest has rebound, both among theorists and practitioners. This paper
2 reviews 
different theoretical perspectives in this area; the old orthodox theory (that of Robert 
Solow and others), more heterodox approaches, and the new orthodox theory 
(commonly labelled new growth theory). Furthermore, we will discuss the relation 
between these theoretical approaches and applied work on growth and policy. Finally 
we assess the available evidence; what is learnt, what we still need to know more 
about. 
 
THE OLD ORTHODOX THEORY 
 
The so-called old orthodox theory, advocated by Solow (1956) and others, was 
developed as a reaction to the contemporary Keynesian generalisations to the long run. 
These generalisations showed that growth with full employment was a possible but 
not at all necessary outcome of market forces. This left a large role to state 
intervention, in particular with respect to income distribution (see Luigi Pasinetti 
1974).  
The neo-classical growth theories developed by Solow and others in the 1950s 
showed that long-run growth with full employment was indeed no problem as long as 
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market forces were allowed to operate freely. However, this result rested on very 
strong assumptions. First, that of technology as a public good, freely available to 
everyone free of charge. Second, the assumption of so-called “perfect competition”, 
which involves, among other things, no economies of scale and no market power of 
firms. Constant returns to scale were imposed, i.e., that a 1 % increase in all inputs 
yields exactly 1 % growth in output.  
When applied to the global economy this theory led to an important prediction. 
Countries that differ in terms of initial productivity levels but not otherwise will 
converge towards the same level of productivity and the same rate of productivity 
growth. Thus, catch-up in productivity and income will take place, as long as market 
forces are allowed to operate freely. If countries differ also in other respects 
(population growth and savings propensities) convergence towards the same growth 
of productivity will still be achieved, but productivity levels will differ. The theory 
also predicts that in the absence of exogenous technological progress, this common 
rate of productivity growth (that all countries will converge towards) will be zero. 
Thus, what we have here is a theory that predicts that apart from exogenous sources 
there will be no productivity growth in the long run. 
 
GROWTH ACCOUNTING 
Armed with this theoretical perspective, economic practitioners started to analyse 
actual growth, weighting the growth of inputs with factor shares. For instance, the 
contribution of capital to economic growth was calculated as the growth of capital 
multiplied by the capitalists’ share of national income. When the contributions from 
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factor growth are added together in this way a residual may occur. This unexplained 
part of actual growth was dubbed “total factor productivity growth”, that is, the part of 
actual growth that cannot be attributed to any single factor. This methodology, so-
called growth accounting, was first applied to historical data for the USA by Moses 
Abramovitz (1956) and later to selected OECD countries by Edward Denison (1967). 
Over the years this methodology has also been applied to many individual countries 
and recently also to the Asian NICs .  
The first exercises in this area showed that only a small part of actual growth could 
be attributed to growth of capital and labour. Up to 80 % remained unexplained and 
had to be classified as so-called total factor productivity growth. That the lion’s share 
of actual growth had to be explained by exogenous technological progress and other 
unidentified sources was something many were not willing to accept. Various 
remedies were invented to improve on this rather embarrassing result. The first was to 
adjust the factors themselves by taking into account the changes in quality and 
composition. For instance, new vintages of capital or labour were assumed to be more 
efficient than previous ones. To some extent this practice boiled down to no more than 
building the unexplained part of actual growth into the factors themselves. Second, it 
was suggested to take into account additional factors such as economies of scale, 
investments in R&D, possible differences in productivity levels across countries and 
sectors and a host of other factors (crime, for instance). For a good overview I refer to 
the paper by Angus Maddison (1987). When these additional factors were taken into 
account the growth accountants were able to explain a much larger part of actual 
growth. There was only one problem, that the very existence of some of these 
additional factors actually contradicts the assumption of the theory on which the 
analysis was based. For instance, the theory explicitly assumes no economies of scale.   5 
Thus, if these additional factors are relevant, and the available evidence suggests that 
they are, what you need is a new theory! 
It was pointed out by Richard Nelson (1964) that growth accounting is not a tested 
theory on growth. Rather it is an analysis - or description - of a growth process based 
on certain assumptions which are taken as given (i.e., not tested). It is clear, however, 
the validity of conclusions from such analyses depends crucially on whether the 
underlying assumptions are true or not. It is important to remember this when 
assessing some of the more recent applications of this methodology. I am referring 
here in particular to Alwyn Young’s recent paper on the East Asian NICs 
(Young1995), where he claims that accumulation of capital and labour explains 
everything there is to explain. To assess this claim you have to find out whether the 
underlying assumptions, on which this conclusion is based, really hold. That means 
that you have to ask the following type of questions: Did perfect competition prevail? 
Were there no large firms with market power? No scale economics? Was technology 
freely available to everyone free of charge? Without answers to this these deeper 
questions growth accounting exercises cannot be used to draw conclusions about what 
drives growth. As pointed out by Robert Lucas (1993), commenting on Young’s 
findings, just observing the fact that input and output growth tend to go hand in hand 
explains nothing.  Arguably, any theory of growth would predict that! 
 
THE HETERODOX CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Alternatives to the neo-classical interpretations of events have been formulated by 
a diverse group of historically oriented economists and economically oriented   6 
historians. I will point to three main contributors: Joseph Schumpeter, Nicholas 
Kaldor and Alexander Gerschenkron.  
Schumpeter (1934, 1939, 1943) focused on innovation activities in firms as the 
driving force behind economic growth. His concept of innovation is broad and goes 
beyond the mere invention of a new product or process. Essentially, he sees 
innovations as “new combinations” of existing pieces of knowledge, whether drawn 
from science, engineering, market research, organisational experience or other 
sources, but with a view to commercial application. Successful innovating firms will 
benefit economically due to the temporary monopoly they get on the innovations they 
make. Eventually, the knowledge embodied in new innovations will diffuse to other 
firms and industries, and this will fuel growth further. It follows from this perspective 
that without innovation there will be no growth.  
While Schumpeter focused on deliberate innovation activities by firms, Kaldor 
(1957, 1967) emphasised yet another aspect of this process by pointing to learning, 
either through investments and the subsequent application of new machinery, or as a 
result of cumulative production (so-called learning by doing) as the source of  
technological progress and growth.  
Gerschenkron (1962) emphasised the national aspects of this process. Some 
countries are at the technological frontier, while others lag behind. Although the 
technological gap between a frontier country at a laggard represents as “a great 
promise” for the latter (a potential for high growth through imitating frontier 
technologies), there are also various problems that may prevent backward countries 
from reaping the potential benefits to the full extent. Gerschenkron argued that if one 
country succeeds in embarking on an innovation-driven growth path others may find it 
increasingly difficult to catch up. He explained this partly as a result of cumulative   7 
learning as emphasised by Kaldor, but also as a result of the dynamics of the 
technological process itself, particularly increasing economies of scale as a function of 
time (as pointed out later by Raymond Vernon (1966) in his product cycle theory). 
Because of such factors, Gerschenkron argued, technologically backward countries 
have to develop new institutional instruments for overcoming these obstacles, above 
all in the financial sector, “instruments  for which there was little or no counterpart in 
an established industrial country” (op.cit., p. 7). Abramovitz (1994) uses the concepts 
“technological congruence” and “social capability” to characterise the situation for 
latecomers. The first concept refers to the degree to which leader and follower country 
characteristics are congruent in areas such as market size, factor supply etc. The 
second points to the various efforts and capabilities that backward countries have to 
develop in order to catch up (education etc.).  
In a sense these more heterodox contributions paint a much bleaker picture of the 
prospects for catch-up than the old orthodox theory. Catch-up is not something that 
can be expected to occur only by market forces left to themselves, but requires a lot of 
effort and institution-building on the part of backward country. An important reason 
for this is that technology is not regarded as a public good but something that to a 
large extent is organisationally embedded and intertwined with other factors of 
production. 
Applied work on technology gaps and catch-up inspired by the heterodox approach 
took several different routes. Gerschenkron and others provided illuminating case-
studies based on material from specific countries. Quantitatively oriented economic 
historians such as Abramovitz and Maddison made detailed investigations into the 
changes in relative productivity across countries in the long run and various efforts 
that countries made to impact on this process. Applying an econometric technique,   8 
John Cornwall (1976) regressed variables assumed to reflect the scope for catch-up, 
investment and endogenous technological progress (the so-called Verdoorn law) on 
GDP growth for a sample of OECD countries. Later, in the 1980s, Keith Pavitt and 
Luc Soete (1982) and Jan Fagerberg (1987) presented regression models that also 
included variables reflecting resources devoted to (or output from) innovation 
(patents/R&D). Inspired by the work by Abramovitz and others on technology gaps 
and growth William Baumol et al. (1989) applied regression models of the type just 
discussed to cross-country samples including up to 100 countries or more. Variables 
taken into account in that study included the scope for catch-up, measured, as in the 
other studies, by GDP per capita, investment, educational attainment and growth of 
population/labour force. Thus, in contrast to studies just discussed, Baumol et al. did 
not include an independent variable reflecting the level of innovation in the country.  
The results from these regression analyses led to a quite vivid debate about how the 
results should be interpreted (see Baumol 1986, Bradford DeLong 1988 and Baumol 
et al. 1989). The conclusion of this debate was that while unconditional convergence 
could perhaps be established for the OECD countries in the post war period, and 
probably extending to some other countries as well, it does not hold for the world as a 
whole. However, when other variables were introduced, such as investment, 
education, etc., the scope for catch-up (approximated with the gap in productivity – or 
GDP per capita - between the country in question and the frontier) regained its role as 
an important explanatory factor behind differences in growth in the world economy, 
so-called “conditional convergence”. These results should not be regarded as very 
surprising except, perhaps, for some very firm believers of the old orthodox theory. 
Heterodox writers, on the other hand, had never predicted global convergence. On the 
contrary, these writers stressed that catch-up was possible but difficult and that   9 
countries wanting to succeed in catch-up processes had to undertake a series of efforts 
to succeed. 
 
THE NEW ORTHODOX THEORY 
 
The problems that traditional neoclassical growth theory and empirical applications 
faced in explaining the “stylised facts” of long run growth,  and the emergence of 
other, competing approaches,  led eventually to a search among neoclassical theorists 
for new models of growth that  could be made consistent with what could actually be 
observed, without having to abandon the neoclassical framework altogether.  The 
central contributor here is Paul Romer. More specifically, he wished to design a model 
that could explain both long-run growth of productivity (without having to revert to 
the assumption of exogenous technological progress) and why convergence in the 
world economy did not occur. In so doing he first followed a route which we may 
label the Kaldor route (Romer 1986). The idea was that capital accumulation leads to 
learning which, however, cannot be appropriated by the firms within which the 
learning takes place. Learning is assumed to be external to firms, hence the 
assumption of constant returns to factor accumulation at the level of the firm can be 
sustained (perfect competition). However, although learning cannot be appropriated 
by any single firm, all firms in a country are assumed to benefit collectively from it. 
Thus, there are increasing returns to accumulation of all factors at the country level. 
This checks the tendency towards decreasing returns to capital accumulation that 
would otherwise have led long-run productivity growth to cease (in the absence of 
exogenous technological progress). Hence, long-run productivity growth may occur,   10 
and rich countries may grow as fast as the poor ones, consistent with the lack of 
convergence in the global economy.  
For various reasons Romer himself was not very satisfied with this first version of 
the theory and therefore in a later work (Romer 1990) suggested an alternative 
framework based on Schumpeterian ideas. Models along similar lines were also 
suggested by a number of other authors such as Gene Grossman and Elhanan 
Helpman (1991) and Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (1992). In contrast to the 
previous model, in which technological progress was considered as a pure externality, 
this new approach models innovation as the outcome of deliberate efforts by firms. 
The assumption of imperfect competition secures that the fixed costs necessary to 
develop new products and processes can be covered. However, although new 
technology in these models is a private good, there is also a public good component 
that feeds back on the capability to produce new innovations in the future. This 
feedback prevents decreasing returns to innovative activity in the economy. Hence, 
innovation and growth may go on. The main difference between this framework and 
the previous one is that in this case it is factors such as resources devoted to R&D the 
degree of appropriability that determine economic growth, not capital accumulation in 
the traditional sense.  
New growth theories may have interesting implication for policy. In the old 
framework, where productivity growth in the long run depended only on exogenous 
technological progress, policy by definition could not have a long-run impact. In these 
new models this is not longer so. Policies that impact on the propensities to invest in 
physical capital (the first type of model) or R&D/innovation (the second one) may 
raise growth permanently. 
   11 
THE EVIDENCE  
 
These theoretical advances led to a surge of empirical work. As the new theory 
differs from the old one in important respects one might perhaps have expected that a 
new type of empirical work would have developed, focusing on new issues, using new 
data and applying new methods. This, however, has not been the case, or at least not 
until very recently.  
What most applied researchers in this area have done is to follow the tradition from 
Cornwall, Baumol and others, applying single equation regression models to cross-
country data sets. This type of work has later been dubbed “Barro regressions” after 
Robert Barro (1991). Basically the models are identical to the ones suggested by 
Baumol et al. (1989), including variables such as the scope for catch-up, investment in 
physical capital, education, population growth and others,  reflecting , for instance, 
differences in the policy stance.  
Much of this work has been summarised by Ross Levine and David Renelt (1992). 
In their paper the various factors that have been emphasised in the empirical literature 
were tested in a systematic way in order to establish how sensitive the findings are for 
inclusion of other possible explanatory variables. The method consists of selecting a 
set of basic variables which always are included in the regression. These are basically 
the variables we already have discussed (the scope for catch-up, investment, education 
and population growth). Other possible variables were included one by one and the 
sensitivity of the result is then tested by including up to three other variables drawn 
from a large pool of possible explanatory factors. If the result is always significant, it 
is termed “robust”. If it is insignificant in at least one case it is considered as “fragile”. 
This, it may be noted, is not a test of causality but of what can be established with   12 
some degree of certainty in single equation cross-country regression framework, given 
the available data. Important relationships may well be found to be fragile following 
this methodology. The principal finding of Levine and Renelt was that the most robust 
relationship is between growth and investment. Some support was also found for 
variables reflecting the scope for catch-up (proxied by GDP per capita gaps) and 
educational efforts. All other explanatory variables were found to be fragile, including 
a large number of policy variables, openness (defined in different ways) and political 
factors (such as democracy, stability etc.). In a later study (Robert King and Ross 
Levine 1993) the level of financial development of the country was added to the list of 
robust relationships. 
What is there to learn from this new generation of empirical research? Not very 
much I will argue. That investment is correlated with growth should come as no 
surprise. Indeed, this is something that would be consistent with most theories in this 
area, including those that consider investment as endogenous to the growth process, as 
available evidence on time series data seems to suggest (see Christopher Carroll and 
David Weil 1993). It is also worth noticing that the studies by Levine and others fail 
to include R&D and innovation, and thus throw little light on the mechanisms 
highlighted by the most recent versions of the new growth theories.  However, the 
results from the empirical literature are useful in the sense that they urge us to use 
some caution when assessing the impact of policy on growth. This is especially 
relevant for those who believe that a so-called “correct” set of macro policies is 
enough to foster development and growth, as argued, for instance, by the World 
Bank.
3 
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argues that 60-90 % of productivity growth of the so-called high-performing Asian economies can be   13 
Another relevant strand of research attempts to measure private and social returns 
to R&D and innovation. This type work has gone on for a long time, independently of 
the developments in growth theory, but attracts a growing interest due to the recent 
changes in formal theorising. Generally, these empirical exercises
4 tend to find high 
private returns to investments in R&D, about twice as high as for other types of 
investment. This, of course, runs counter to traditional neoclassical perspectives on 
investment, according to which returns to different types of investments should be 
equalised. Hence, one of the central issues in this area, which we will not venture into 
here, has been how these high private returns can be explained. However, high as 
these private returns may be, social returns are commonly found to be even higher, 
indicating important positive spillovers from R&D, especially when conducted in 
private firms. These are, of course, results that concur very well with recent theorising 
in this area.   
Recently, there have been some attempts to address these issues from a perspective 
that draws more explicitly on the advances in the growth literature. Central questions 
in this more recent literature are to what extent diffusion processes are influenced by 
geographical (and other) boundaries, whether country size matters and what the most 
efficient carriers of technology diffusion are.  Although research in this area is still in 
early stage, the available evidence seems to indicate that diffusion of technology 
(knowledge spillovers) is hampered by distance (Adam Jaffe 1986, Jaffe, Manuel 
                                                                                                                                            
explained by accumulation and thus that other “unconventional” factors were of relatively little 
importance. I have shown elsewhere (Aadne Cappelen and Jan Fagerberg 1995) that this conclusion is 
not warranted. Indeed, the models applied by the World Bank predict very poorly for the fast-growing 
countries of Asia. A careful reading of the reported results shows that the only variable that really 
contributes to the explanation of the difference in productivity growth between these countries and 
those of the OECD area is the scope for catch-up (GDP per capita). There are also other attempts in the 
report to prove the case; these are not more convincing. See Dani Rodrik (1994). 
4 The literature has been surveyed by Zvi Griliches (1992) and Pierre Mohnen (1992). For a more 
recent overview see Bart Verspagen (1995).   14 
Trajtenberg and Rebecca Henderson 1993), and is generally easier and quicker within 
than across country borders (Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum 1996). There is also 
some evidence suggesting that returns to R&D investment are higher in large 
countries (David Coe and Helpman 1995, Maury Gittleman and Edward Wolff 1995), 
consistent with some of the suggestions from recent advances in growth theory 
On the last question, regarding carriers of technology, the evidence is shakier. New 
technology may diffuse in many different ways; embodied in goods or services that 
make use new technology, through foreign direct investments by multinational firms 
or by imitative activities by domestic firms, drawing on a multitude of sources, as well 
as (necessary) complementary assets/capabilities. Some recent exercises point to R&D 
embodied in imports of goods and services as a very efficient way of transmitting new 
technology (Coe and Helpman 1995, Coe, Helpman and Alexander Hoffmaister 
1997). The conclusion, then, is that foreign R&D embodied in imports is the primary 
source of growth in most countries, particularly the developing ones, and that 
openness to trade is what is required if a country is going to benefit from the global 
process of innovation and diffusion.  However, others, using essentially the same type 
of indicator, fail to reproduce these results (Gittleman and Wolff 1995). Verspagen 
(1997) shows that the impact of foreign R&D, whether embodied in trade or 
otherwise, are much stronger in the time series than in the cross-sectional dimension, 
indicating that there  - in addition to differences in “openness” - exist persistent 
differences across countries in their capacity to absorb foreign technology. Other 
recent contributions also point to differences in absorptive capacity (education, 
infrastructure, technological capabilities etc.) as the most important factor explaining 
differences in growth and welfare across countries (Gittleman and Wolff 1995, Eaton 




While traditional neoclassical theory treated technology as exogenous, and hence 
failed to explain growth, recent advances in formal theorising have gone a long way in 
incorporating technology and innovation. This has led to the creation of more complex 
models, that may explain growth in a better way than before. These models are also 
more open in the sense that many different outcomes are possible, depending on what 
the key assumptions are. Many of these assumptions cannot be established on a priori 
grounds, at least not at the current state of formal theorising in this area, but need to 
be verified through empirical research. This has led to a new agenda for empirical 
research that is both more meaningful and more interesting than what we had before.   
Previously, on easily got the impression that theoretical and empirical work on 
growth proceeded at very different levels. With the risk of exaggerating a bit, one may 
describe it as follows. At the one hand you had the theoreticians, sitting in their ivory 
towers, making a priori “true” models. On the other the empiricists, applying these 
assumedly true models to data, using ever more sophisticated techniques, leaving out 
an increasingly large share of the actual variation in the data as irrelevant. There were 
very little feedback from empirical work on formal modelling. Arguably, what is in 
most need of empirical research is not so much the concrete shape of the various 
relationships that formal models entail, as the basic assumptions that these models 
embody (including areas where our current knowledge is so limited that assumptions 
are made essentially ad hoc). The most important contribution, I will argue, that 
empirical work can make to formal modelling is to raise the quality of the 
assumptions that theoreticians make use of.   16 
  While formal modelling in this area has greatly improved in terms of how 
technology is handled, other basic neoclassical features have retained, such as the idea 
of “the representative agent”. While this may be a useful simplification in some 
instances, it certainly runs counter to one of the most basic arguments of evolutionary 
theory; that agents are different (heterogeneous), that this creates diversity, which is 
what drives innovation. Hence, following this view, to explain diversity of growth 
patterns, one has to allow for heterogeneous agents, whether at the level of the 
individual entrepreneur, firm or nation state.  This is an area where more empirical 
work is needed, and which potentially could be of great importance for formal 
theorising as well. However, to be able to respond to this challenge, empirical 
researchers have to go beyond empirical approaches that essentially consist of filtering 
out heterogeneity.  Probably, to get a firm grasp on heterogeneity, one will need more 
case-oriented research of the type undertaken in many other disciplines, as well as by 
the grand economic masters of the past, such as Karl Marx and Alfred Marshall. This 
does, of course, not invalidate the use of other methods that are currently in more use 
in economics. Arguably, empirical work will need to proceed at several levels, not in 
isolation, but in interaction.   17 
References 
 
Abramovitz, M.(1956) Resources and Output Trends in the United States since 1870, 
American Economic Review 46: 5-23  
 
Abramovitz,  M.  (1994)  The  Origins  of  the  Postwar  Catch-Up  and  Convergence 
Boom, in Fagerberg, J.et al. (1994), pp. 21-52 
 
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992) A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction, 
Econometrica 60: 323-351  
 
Barro, R. (1991) Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 106: 407-443 
 
Baumol,  W.J.  (1986)  Productivity  Growth,  Convergence  and  Welfare:  What  the 
Long Run Data Show, American Economic Review 76: 1072-1085 
 
Baumol,  W.J,  S.A.  Batey  Blackman  and  E.N.  Wolff  (1989)  Productivity  and 
American Leadership: The Long View, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 
 
Cappelen, A. and J. Fagerberg (1995) East Asian Growth: A Critical Assessment, 
Forum for Development Studies, No. 2, pp. 175-195 
 
Carrol, C. D. and D. N. Weil (1993) Saving and Growth: A Reinterpretation, NBER 
Working Paper, No. 4470, Cambridge(USA): National Bureau of Economic Research  
 
Coe, D.T. and E. Helpman (1995) International R&D Spillovers, European 
Economic Review 39: 859-887 
 
Coe, D.T., E. Helpman and Alexander Hoffmaister (1997) North-South R&D 
Spillovers, Economic Journal 107: 134-149 
 
Cornwall,  J.(1976)  Diffusion,  Convergence  and  Kaldor's  Law,  Economic  Journal  
86:307-314 
 
De  Long,  J.B.  (1988) Productivity Growth, Convergence and Welfare,  American 
Economic Review 78: 1138-1154 
 
Denison,  E.F.(1967)  Why  Growth  Rates  Differ:  Post-War  Experience    in  Nine 
Western Countries, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution 
 
Eaton, J. and S, Kortum (1997) Trade in Ideas - Patenting and Productivity in the 
OECD, Journal of International Economics 40, 251-278 
 
Fagerberg, J. (1987) A Technology Gap Approach to Why Growth Rates Differ, 
Research Policy 16: 87-99  
 
   18 
Fagerberg,  J.  (1994)  Technology  and  International  Differences  in  Growth  Rates, 
Journal of Economic Literature 32: 1147-1175 
 
Fagerberg, J., Verspagen, B. and von Tunzelman, N. (eds.) (1994) The Dynamics of 
Technology, Trade and Growth, Aldershot: Edward Elgar 
 
Fishlow,  A.  et  al.  (1994)  Miracle  or  Design?  Lessons  from  the  East  Asian 
Experience, Policy Essay No. 11, Washington, DC.: Overseas Development Council 
 
Gerschenkron,  A.(1962)  Economic  Backwardness  in  Historical  Perspective, 
Cambridge(USA): The Belknap Press 
 
Gittleman, M. and E. N. Wolff (1995) R&D Activity and Cross-Country Growth 
Comparisons, Cambridge Journal of Economics 19: 189-207 
 
Griliches,  Z.  (1992)  The  Search  for  R&D  Spillovers,  Scandinavian  Journal  of 
Economics  94: S29-S47 
 
Grossman,  G.M.  and  E.  Helpman  (1991)  Innovation  and  Growth  in  the  Global 
Economy, Cambridge(USA): The MIT Press   
 
Jaffe, A. B. (1986) Real Effects of Academic Research, American Economic Review 
79: 957-970 
 
Jaffe, A. B., M. Trajtenberg and R. Henderson (1993) Geographic Localization of 
Knowledge  Spillovers  as  Evidenced  by  Patent  Citations,  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics 108: 557-598 
 
Kaldor, N. (1957) A Model of Economic Growth, Economic Journal 67: 591624 
 
Kaldor,  N.  (1967)  Strategic  Factors  in  Economic  Development, New York State 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Itacha, New York 
 
King, R. and R. Levine (1993) Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right? 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 717-737   
 
Levine, R. and D. Renelt (1992) A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions, American Economic Review 82: 942-963 
 
Lucas, R.E. (1993) Making a Miracle, Econometrica, 61: 251-272 
 
Maddison, A. (1987) Growth and Slowdown in Advanced Capitalist Economies: 
Techniques of Quantitative Asessment, Journal of Economic Literature 25: 649-698 
 
Mohnen,  P.  (1992)  The  Relationship  Between  R&D  and  Productivity  Growtr  in 
Canada and other Major Industrialized Countries, Economic Council of Canada 
 
Nelson,  R.  (1964)  Aggregate  Production  Functions  and  Medium-Range  Growth 
Projections, American Economic Review 54: 575-606   19 
 
Pasinetti,  L.L.  (1974)  Growth  and  Income  Distribution,  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Pavitt, K. and Soete, L.G.(1982) International Differences in Economic Growth and 
the  International  Location  of  Innovation,  in  Giersch,  H.(ed.)(1982)  Emerging 
Technologies:  Consequences  for  Economic  Growth,  Structural  Change,  and 
Employment, Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
 
Rodrik, D. (1994) King Kong Meets Godzilla: The World Bank and the East Asian 
Miracle, in Fishlow et al. (1994), pp. 13-53 
 
Romer, P.M. (1986) Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, Journal of Political 
Economy 94: 1002-1037 
 
Romer,  P.M.  (1990)  Endogenous  Technological  Change,  Journal  of  Political 
Economy 98: S71-S102  
 
Schumpeter,J.(1934)  The  Theory  of  Economic  Development.  Cambridge,  Mass.: 
Harvard University Press 
 
Schumpeter,J.(1939) Business Cycles I-II. New York: McGraw-Hill 
  
Schumpeter,J.(1943) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper 
 
Solow, R.(1956) A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 70: 65-94   
 
Vernon, R.(1966) International Investment and International Trade in the Product 
Cycle, Quarterly Journal of Economics 80: 190-207   
 
Verspagen, B. (1995) R&D and Productivity: A Broad Cross-Section Cross-Country 
Look, The Journal of Productivity Analysis g: 117-135 
 
Verspagen,  B.  (1997)  Estimating  International  Technology  Spillovers  Using 
Technology Flow Matrices, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 133: 226- 248   
 
World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle. Economic Growth and Public Policy, 
New York: Oxford University Press  
 
Young, A. (1995) The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of 
the East Asian Growth Experience, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 641-680  
 